The foundation of our work at Logos is a commitment to support technology-led productivity growth that builds a more prosperous economy. As we close out a consequential year and look toward 2026 and beyond, rising anti-AI sentiment is becoming a material investing consideration. The opportunity remains enormous but capturing it demands judgement about which investments can compound value in a more constrained political and social environment.
Across both parties, there are minority factions whose agendas center on accelerating economic growth through revitalized industrial policy. The “Abundance”[i] movement on the center-left promotes a pro building, pro supply argument: the U.S. can restore affordability and progress by making it easier to build housing, energy[ii], and infrastructure[iii], which comes by rebuilding government’s capacity to execute. On the right, an “American dominance”[iv] agenda emphasizes strength through energy[v] and reshoring[vi] for strategic industries[vii]. Both aim to transform an economy that is dependent on foreign manufacturing[viii] and repeatedly roadblocks energy[ix][x], housing[xi], and infrastructure[xii] development.
Artificial intelligence is now the focal point of these growth agendas. Yet parts of Silicon Valley, central to these pro-growth coalitions, are underestimating the speed and severity of public backlash against AI, along with deepening mistrust of the tech elite. This shift is turning AI into a political liability and weakening the political mandate that both coalitions need. It is producing a groundswell poised to shape the 2026 midterms and grow central to the 2028 presidential election[1].
Public attitudes toward AI have cooled markedly since the launch of OpenAI’s ChatGPT. Today, more than half of Americans express more concern than excitement about AI’s impact[xiii]. Further polling shows that nearly three-quarters of Americans fear permanent job loss from AI and a similar percentage worry that it will be used to provoke political unrest through deepfakes[xiv]. The implication is a social climate that views AI not as a beneficial tool, but as a threat to employment, identity, and stability.
While the Trump Administration has pushed to accelerate AI deployment[xv] and the corresponding infrastructure buildout[xvi], bipartisan pushback is emerging at the state and local level, especially around data centers. All fifty states have introduced AI-related measures, and more than 100 bills have passed out of over 1,000 introduced[xvii][xviii][2]. Local siting risk is also rising with fewer than half of Americans saying they would support a data center in their community[xix] and Senator Bernie Sanders recently calling for a moratorium on new data center development. Senator Josh Hawley captured the moment succinctly: “These data centers are massive electricity hogs. Someone has to pay for it all. Do not believe any politician who says it will not ultimately be you.“ Together, these positions align with polling that finds majorities of both the public and AI experts are worried the government will underregulate AI [xx].
This populist narrative is increasingly in tension with the public data to date and our own experience within the portfolio. Over the two years since ChatGPT’s release, AI adoption has largely complemented workers rather than replaced them, with jobs and real wages growing in occupations with high AI exposure[xxi][xxii]. Meanwhile, real consumer energy prices have declined since 2010 and are tracking inflation since 2019[xxiii][3], even amid rising demand. We should not dismiss legitimate concerns about concentrated job displacement, misinformation, and local energy bottlenecks. But so far, the realized effects of AI have been counter to the alarmist political narratives.
Prominent voices often frame AI in dystopian terms or as an arms race with China, which may be strategically resonant in Washington but is counterproductive to building durable public support for a technology that can raise worker productivity and advance industry. At the November US–Saudi Investment Forum, Elon Musk drew applause when he told the audience that “work will be optional” and that “at some point currency becomes irrelevant”[4]. Palantir, by contrast, has been the most explicit about public wariness, running ads stating that Americans are being sold an AI future where they are “obsolete or irrelevant” and promising that it will “make Americans irreplaceable”[xxiv]. Notably, Palantir’s business model, which sends engineers into the field to deploy AI, gives it one of the clearest vantage points on the technology’s actual impact on labor and industry.
Our view is that the most durable AI thesis is not replacement, but capability expansion: AI increases what organizations and high agency individuals can accomplish. Across the Logos portfolio, companies are applying AI in insurance processing, chemical sales, cybersecurity operations, small business administration, and professional services hiring, automating drudgery while enabling teams to accomplish more. Delivering that value depends less on model sophistication than on thoughtful productization and well-organized implementation. The strongest founders understand that the economic buyer is often not the end user. They obsess over the jobs to be done and build tools that make workers 10x more effective rather than replace them outright. This is the reality of fast-growing AI software companies, even if it remains politically difficult to communicate.
The political reaction to AI is accelerating faster than its realized effects on work and wages. That mismatch is becoming a defining feature of the investment landscape, one where returns will increasingly accrue to AI businesses that compound value through the expansion of human capability.
[1] For those looking for a prediction market play here, JD Vance may face tough sledding in the Republican primary given his Silicon Valley relationships. A contrast compared to the prediction market odds that have Vance as the favorite.
[2] These create reporting requirements, mandated disclosures and labels, and liability for model and product developers.
[3] Recent increases in nominal energy prices are largely due to inflation for the assets and labor that maintain and replace the aging infrastructure of energy distribution, not data centers.
[4] Let the record show that I like my work more than these people.
[i] Noah Kazis (2025) – Abundance by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson.
[ii] Biden Administration (2023) – Build a Green Energy Economy.
[iii] The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) (2021) – Build.gov.
[iv] Diana Furchtgott-Roth (2025) - Why American Energy Dominance Is a Strategic Imperative.
[v] Trump Administration (2025) – Unleashing American Energy.
[vi] Trump Administration (2025) – Regulatory Relief to Promote Domestic Production of Critical Medicines.
[vii] KCUR (2025) – Could Kansas Panasonic plant get hit in Trump’s campaign against clean energy?
[viii] CHIPS Act (2022) – Public Law 117-167.
[ix] Phys.org (2025) – Opposition to energy transition projects driven by local concerns rather than right-wing populism, finds study.
[x] Reuters (2025) – US terminates financial aid for big Midwest power transmission project.
[xi] Bloomberg (2025) – Mapping a Way Out of the US Housing Affordability Crisis.
[xii] Stanford West (2024) – Investing in the Future of Mobility: The Role of U.S. Local Governments in Building EV Infrastructure.
[xiii] Pew Research Center (2025) – How Americans View AI and Its Impact on People and Society.
[xiv] Reuters / Ipsos Poll (2025) – Americans fear AI permanently displacing workers, poll finds.
[xv] Trump Administration (2025) – Accelerating Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure (EO 14318).
[xvi] Trump Administration (2025) – Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence.
[xvii] Kuckuk, Adam. “Governments Walk a Fine Line as Use of AI Expands.” National Conference of State Legislatures. August 19, 2025. NCSL State AI Bills.
[xviii] Brookings Institution (2025) – How different states are approaching AI.
[xix] Heatmap News (2025) – The Data Center Backlash Is Swallowing American Politics.
[xx] Pew Research Center (2025). How the U.S. Public and AI Experts View Artificial Intelligence.
[xxi] Vanguard Investment Strategy Group (2025). AI Exuberance: Economic Upside, Stock Market Downside. 2026 Economic and Market Outlook.
[xxii] Chen, Weixuan, Suraj Srinivasan, and Shervin Zakerinia. “Displacement or Complementarity? The Labor Market Impact of Generative AI.” Working Paper no. 25-039. Harvard Business School, 2024.
[xxiii] Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory & The Brattle Group (2025) – Factors Influencing Recent Trends in Retail Electricity Prices in the United States (Full Summary).